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  1Less Discussed Dynamics in the Czech Farm Structure Development 
Jarmila Curtiss, Tomáš Ratinger, Tomáš Medonos
1
Abstract 
The paper provides an empirical study on the dynamics of ownership changes in Czech agricultural 
companies, which are assigned by unique heterogeneity in ownership forms. Since employee 
ownership has retained a relatively important place in these structures, neoclassical, as well as 
institutional theories of labour-managed firms are considered. Building upon efficiency arguments, 
both approaches suggest the dissolution of labour-managed firms. The empirical analysis utilized 
detailed survey data from 2004 and accountancy data from 1997 to 2003. We used a cluster analysis 
to classify companies into homogeneous groups with respect to their ownership structure and stage 
of restructuring, and analysed these characteristics in relation to performance indicators. The 
companies were found to be in various transition stages. The results reveal that the most progressed 
and the most profitable companies have significantly higher capital concentration, a low number of 
owners and a low share of employee and external ownership. The least restructured companies with 
higher employee and external ownership show markedly worse performance figures. The 
restructuring process is complex and farms have adopted different strategies; only restructuring the 
firm’s liabilities by capitalising transformation debts appeared insufficient for improving 
performance. 
JEL classification 
D2, L1, L2 
Keywords 
Cluster analysis, Czech agriculture, Ownership, Large-scale farms, Performance, Principal 
component analysis. 
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  21 Introduction 
The wide variety of ownership configurations in the transition economies of Central and Eastern 
Europe has been viewed as a unique opportunity by many researchers to empirically investigate the 
ownership/performance relationship and the factors of ownership structure development. However, 
very few studies considered the dynamics of ownership changes and their relationship to economic 
performance in agriculture. This is despite the fact that large-scale farming has retained its 
dominance in many transition countries and allowed a formation of various ownership forms. 
Large-scale farms have been analysed in various contexts, such as efficiency and economic growth 
or structural changes and property rights development (e.g. Schlüter 2001; Brem 2000). In the 
context of efficiency and economic advantage, large-scale farms have mostly been analysed in 
comparison to smaller family type farms, or the effect of their size and legal form on technical 
efficiency have been discussed (e.g. Latruff et al., 2005; Curtiss 2002). This study will consider the 
dynamics of the ownership structure in Czech agriculture, which is characterised by heterogeneity 
in investor and employee ownership, various levels of ownership concentration, and a distinct 
degree of separation of production control and ownership. The objective of this study is to 
empirically explore the ownership structure/performance relationship and explain the dynamics of 
this ownership structure development.  
We structure the paper as follows: In the second section, we describe the structural changes 
in Czech agriculture. In the third section, we present theoretical models and derive hypotheses. In 
section four, we describe the survey and accountancy data. In section five, we discuss the empirical 
results from principal component and cluster analyses. We conclude in section six.  
2  From Cooperatives to new forms – empirical background 
The study focuses on agricultural companies, of either a cooperative or any other legal entity, that 
have come about through transformation (CRTs), primarily from former collective farms. The 
privatisation scheme for former collective farms (a) restored original property rights of so-called 
  3eligible persons to the extent of the originally-collectivised assets, with the aim of correcting 
injustices brought about by collectivisation, and (b) distributed assets acquired after collectivisation 
among eligible persons and persons once employed in the collective farm. Therefore, newly-formed 
companies mostly recruited labour that simultaneously held ownership rights; the companies were 
thus primarily established as labour-managed firms (LMFs). Employed owners (currently working 
and retired) held an important proportion of assets (on average 73.2% of net equity of the CRTs, 
currently working 27.8%, in 1994, (Divila 1996)), and thus likely had large influence on the 
management of the business. However, a large share of the equity was assigned to a number of 
external eligible persons who for various reasons opted for membership/shareholding (26.8% of the 
net equity of the CRTs in 1994) And finally, there were residual eligible persons (REPs)
2, who did 
not join the new companies owning 35% of the assets of the CRTs (Divila 1996). They requested to 
receive their transformation claims predominantly in monetary terms, while CRTs would have 
preferred the settlement in physical terms. Settling REPs’ claims has been pursued slowly and has 
exceeded the end of 1999 deadline
3 set by the transformation law. Thus the REPs decided to 
become ’informal creditors’ with significantly restricted property rights and no control over their 
assets for seven years, rather than becoming members in cooperatives or shareholders in other legal 
entities. The term “informal credit” refers to the lack of formal contract between parties - CRTs and 
REPs or the imperfections in contract specification which relate to lacking important components 
like duration, principals, rental rates, safeguards, etc. It also comprises imperfect institutional 
environments surrounding these transactions. Both parties expect the state to guarantee their rights 
by amending the transformation legislation, but political discourse has thus far yielded nothing but 
uncertainty.  
                                                 
2 The average value of the assets assigned to REP is, on average, small. Two-fifths of the REP own assets below 10,000 
Czech Crowns (330 Euros), with the “richer” fifth owning over 100,000 Czech Crowns (3,300 Euros) (Divila 2001). 
3 The ownership was restored but a range of property rights attributes (like generating income, control over the assets) 
was not enforceable for 7 years after the adoption of a transformation project i.e. before the turn of the years 1999 and 
2000. 
  4In contrast, the terms “transformation debt” or “transformation liability” refer to all liabilities to 
REPs, either formal or informal. Initially, most of the transformation debts were just informal 
credits of REPs. 
The share of transformation debts on total assets
4 in 1995 was 37% in Coops, 56% in 
Limited Liability Companies (LTDs), and 13.6% in Joint Stock Companies (JSCs), respectively; in 
2003 these numbers were 25% in Coops, 29% in LTDs, and 3.6% in JSCs. The amount of unsettled  
transformation claims in the sector was 55 billion Czech Crowns in 1992, 44 billion in 1996  and 15 
billion in 2002 (MA 2003). It is supposed that a significant proportion of the transformation debt 
settlement, however, occurred through capitalisation in which case cooperatives transformed into 
JSCs, and the REPs joined the company in its new legal form. This led to an extension of the 
number of owners through external ownership. Therefore, the CRTs are assigned by a high degree 
of employee ownership and simultaneously high share of external ownership. The rest (29 billions 
CZK) of the settled transformation liabilities was either paid-off or returned with full title but 
consequently often rented back by the agricultural company. Under these conditions, the structure 
of legal entities evolved as illustrated in Table 1. 
TABLE 1  Structure of legal entities in Czech agriculture 
 1995  1997  2003 
 Coops  JSCs  LTDs  Coops  JSCs LTDs Coops JSCs LTDs 
Total  number  1151 298  1132 875 570  1526  686 657  1662 
Share on total ag. land (%)  47.0  7.6  20.1  34.5  18.2  21.8  26.3  22.3  21.2 
Transform. indebtedness 
(CZK billions) 
37.0 13.6  56.1 34.9 9.2 46.2  25.1 3.6 29.0 
Source: MA 1996, 1999, 2003; FADN-CZ 1998, 2003; Divila (2001). 
 
The main shift in the structure happened between cooperatives and JSCs. The number and the area 
cultivated by cooperatives dropped by around 40 percent, while number of JSCs doubled and the 
area tripled between 1995 and 2003. Nowadays, all three legal forms occupy more or less similar 
areas. LTDs are on average almost three times smaller than the other forms and least labour 
                                                 
4 FADN-CZ data 1995, 2003 
  5intensive (2.3 persons per 100 hectares comparing with 4.1 and 5.8 in Coops and JSCs 
respectively). In spite of the inflow of the converted cooperatives the volume of transformation 
indebts fell by 74 percent in the group of JSCs.  
3  From Cooperatives to new forms – theoretical discussion 
Our notion is that there are three sources/underlying processes of structural change 
1.  Maximising members utility leading to a gradual conversion of LMF in a profit maximising 
firm (PMF); 
2.  Eliminating agency problem if ownership concentrates; 
3.  Reducing indebtedness by capitalising transformation liabilities to REPs which requires a 
more flexible business form (conversion of cooperatives into JSCs) 
The theoretical discussion considers neoclassical and institutional theory of the evolution of 
producer cooperatives as a representative for LMFs. The former builds upon Miyazaki’s (1984) 
model. 
3.1  Neoclassical theory of the labour managed firm  
The neoclassical theory assumes that behaviour of a firm can be explained through its objective and 
production function, which is subject to a given technology. The existence of various firm 
objectives interprets the evolution of different organisational forms. A capitalistic firm is 
traditionally described though the objectives of profit maximisation. An objective of a producer 
cooperative or LMF has, in the neoclassical theories, been defined in various ways. For example, 
Domar (1966) and Vanek (1970) build upon the assumption that producer cooperatives maximise 
the per member income, while Miyazaki (1984) argues that LMFs maximise members’ utility, 
which is a function of income and job security. The latter approach is discussed below in more 
detail. 
  6The Miyazaki (1984) model considers LMF as a production coalition of member workers with 
mutually-binding contracts with the above-described objective. Further, it supposes that LMF deals 
with two capital markets: the internal wage fund and the external capital market. If the LMF needs 
to lay off some labour temporarily, it may be acceptable if furloughed members are compensated (in 
agriculture also “in kind”). This compensation must be available for all members, otherwise 
working members will opt for another job. 
In the case that the LMF has access to the perfect capital market, enabling it to optimally 
schedule the payments of the rental cost of capital, the Miyazaki (1984) model suggests that, if the 
LMF operates profitably, it will in the long-run optimise members’ remuneration as the subject of 
their utility function if it replaces all the member-workers by hired workers and gradually reduces 
membership. This means that the LMF dissolves into a profit-maximising firm. On the other hand, 
under the threat of bankruptcy the optimal strategy is to expand membership, which will reduce the 
per member risk of losing one’s job, but of course members must occasionally accept lower-than-
opportunity income. 
If the capital market is imperfect, LMF which operates profitably at each stage of the path 
will tend to convert to profit maximising firm, while LMF expecting only long-run profitability to 
be positive will continue to exist in a labour managed form. In the other cases, the LMF cannot 
survive. Miyazaki’s results thus suggest that a LMF will inevitably convert into a profit maximising 
firm when its long-term performance and capital market improve. 
3.2  Institutional theory of the labour managed firm  
Institutional theory views a firm as a contractual coalition of resource owners who decide to join an 
economic undertaking because of expected economic advantages. The contract between the 
coalition participants sets their disposal rights to the firm resources, where firms can vary with 
respect to the internal institutions which define disposal rights. Institutional economics assumes that 
the firm internal institutions systematically influence the resource allocation and has inherent, 
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individuals does not allow the contract to be perfect and allows opportunistic behaviour. Internal 
organisation thus determines the efficiency of resource allocation within the firm and thereby factor 
productivity and competitiveness. The efficiency of the internal organisation is then, conversely, a 
factor that influences organisational changes.  
Democratic governance structures such as those existing in LMFs are associated with 
communication and bargaining costs, which exponentially increase with the number of the 
organisation members and the complexity of the production technique (see, e.g. Williamson 1975). 
Reorganisation to a hierarchical coordination and decision-making structure can significantly lower 
communication and bargaining costs. However, a hierarchical organisation brings advantages only 
if large organisational advantages such as technical scale or scope economies are present. If these 
advantages are compensated by the transaction costs of the hierarchical coordination and decision-
making structure, an organisation could benefit from transforming to a more decentralised and 
independent governance structure (see, e.g. Williamson 1975). 
Another disadvantage of a cooperative organisation is that the traditional equal remuneration 
and mutual control provide insufficient incentives for labour performance (see, e.g. Sen 1966) and 
results in high control costs, respectively. These disincentive costs increase with the number of 
organisation members. This is also true for control costs; nevertheless, these also increase with the 
increasing firm size and complexity of the production process (Axelrod 1987; Ribhegge 1986). 
However, both cost categories can be reduced through a firm’s conversion to a performance-
oriented remuneration and hierarchical control (Alchian and Demsetz 1972). Also, the hierarchical 
control which would require an ownership concentration and incentive structure is favourable only 
if the advantages of a large firm exceed control and incentive costs. Otherwise, a transformation to 
self-employment through which control and incentives are reduced might be advantageous. 
Based on Miyazaki’s model, transaction cost arguments, and the empirical context presented in 
Section 2, we can hypothesise that agricultural companies with LMFs’ character are less efficient 
  8and represent a transient ownership form which is going to develop into a PMFs with hierarchical 
organization with more concentrated ownership. 
4  Data and variables 
Ownership structure and further farm characteristic data were collected in the Czech Republic in 
2004. This extensive data survey was organised by the Institute for Agricultural Development in 
Central and Eastern Europe (IAMO) and by the Research Institute for Agricultural Economics in 
Prague (VUZE). Data for the construction of selected farm-level economic performance indicators 
were taken from the Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) CZ survey. The sample consists of 
data on 167 agricultural companies with a legal entity status. These farms include 87 cooperatives, 
60 JSCs and 20 LTDs
5. The firms in the sample can be mostly classified as farms with combined 
crop and animal production, but their crop/animal production proportions and size significantly 
varies. The definitions of the ownership and structural variables, as well as performance indicators 
derived from the data, are provided in Table 1. 
5 Empirical  analysis 
Principal component analysis was applied to detect the mutual relationship between farm ownership 
and structural variables. This analysis determined six components, which were further used as 
composed variables in a K-means cluster analysis. The objective of the cluster analysis was to 
classify analysed companies into homogeneous groups with respect to their ownership structure and 
stage of organisational transformation. The best clustering solution provided six clusters
6. The 
                                                 
5 This configuration does not necessarily reflect the farm structure in Czech agriculture (see Table 1); it rather reflects 
the willingness to cooperate in the survey. 
6 Missing observations for some of the variables in the components caused a significant reduction – to 82 total 
observations – of the sample size for the cluster analyses. The number of observations in other structural variables 
which are used to illustrate the cluster differences varies, as indicated in Table 3. The number of observations for the 
performance indicators is 373. This is because an unbalanced panel for seven years is used. The reason for using panel 
data is that performance indicators can vary between years depending on the chosen strategy, e.g. investment strategy, 
and local weather conditions. Therefore, considering only one year could lead to an interpretation bias. 
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cluster differences are provided in Table 2. 
TABLE 1:  Variables description 
 Unit   
EXTEROWN   Share 0 to1  Share of external investors on total number of owners 
LTD  No 0/Yes 1  Legal form of LTD 
EMPLOWN  Share 0 to 1  Share of employed owners on total numbers of employees 
COOP  No 0/Yes 1  Legal form of cooperative 
COMPAGE Years  Company  age 
OWNDECR   No 0/Yes 1  Intention to decrease the number of owners in the next five years 
CAPSHARE  1,000 CZK  Average per owner share on legal (fixed) capital 
TRANSFDEBT  %  Transformation debt to asset ratio = level of transformation indebtedness 
VOTING  No 0/Yes 1  Voting system equal to one member (shareholder) one vote 
MANOWNDIFF  Categ. 1-4  Interest differences between owners and managers 
PROBWMORAL  Categ. 1-4  Problems with workers’ working moral 
OWNENGAGM  Categ. 1-4  Owners engagement in company’s operation 
NONAGRPROD  Share 0 to1  Share of non-agricultural production on total farm revenues 
SIZE  Million CZK  Total farm revenues 
PARTEST  No 0/Yes 1  Farm established through partition of formal collective or state farm 
CROPSHARE  Share 0 to1  Share of crop production on revenues from agricultural production 
MANOWN   No 0/Yes 1  Managers own higher ownership shares that the average share 
CAPSHARE2   1,000 CZK  Average per owner share on own equity 
OWNDIF  1,000 CZK  Difference between the largest and smallest ownership share in the farm 
OWNERNR   Number  of  owners 
EMPLNR   Number  of  employees 
LAND  ha  Size of the cultivated agricultural land 
WAGE  1,000 CZK  Average wage per worker  
CREDDEBT  %  Credit liabilities to total asset ration = level of credit indebtedness 
PROFIT1 %  Return of Assets indicator is constructed as Accounting Value Added from 
agricultural and non-agricultural activities including operational subsidies 
divided by total assets.  
PROFIT2  %  PROFIT1 without operational subsidies. 
LABORPROD  CZK/ 
working 
hours 
Total revenues from agricultural and non-agricultural activities divided by 
total working hours. 






















Component 1.  Ownership structure 
EXTEROWN    82  0.11 0.74 0.74 0.86 0.88 0.80  40.88***
LTD 
1) 82  100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%  81.00***
EMPLOWN  82  0.09 0.51 0.64 0.76 0.55 0.58  12.57***
Component 2.  Stage of transformation 
COOP 
1) 82  0% 80% 100% 6% 0% 78%  52.44***
COMPAGE  82  10.70 10.70 11.62 6.22 8.75 10.07  9.20***
OWNDECR 
1)   82  0%  100% 69% 22% 50%  67%  29.99***
Component 3.  Capital structure 
CAPSHARE  82  113.20 298.40 33.77 147.56 133.75 101.19  16.21***
TRANSFDEBT  82  48.49 15.68 51.65 6.35 3.07 24.75  11.81***
VOTING 
1) 82  80% 30% 69% 6% 0% 33%  23.89***
Component 4.  Agency problem 
MANOWNDIFF 
2) 82  1.70 2.40 2.62 1.89 1.75 1.74  13.35**
PROBWMORAL 
2) 82  1.10 1.20 1.46 1.22 1.50 0.78  10.29**
OWNENGAGM 
2) 82  3.30 1.90 1.85 2.06 2.50 2.37  28.43***
Component 5.  Size and Scope 
NONAGRPROD  82  0.06 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.29 0.03  12.21***
SIZE 82  79.52  143.96 211.28 170.93 307.50  93.84  16.67***
PARTEST 
1) 82 100% 90% 69% 44% 25% 70%  14.88**
Component 6.  Managerial ownership 
CROPSHARE  82  0.40 0.37 0.44 0.44 0.49 0.41 1.08
MANOWN 
1)    82  10% 40% 15% 44% 25% 48% 7.85
Other structural characteristics 
CAPSHARE2    82  2298.28 393.11 141.32 153.69 145.77 262.86  7.88***
OWNDIF  64  6.86 1162.13 684.50 1249.13 1298.50  993.70 3.85***
OWNERNR  82  4.20 141.60 297.85 474.78 899.25 253.74  12.82***
EMPLNR  82  42.00 67.00 99.69 76.50 153.25 46.15  14.43***
LAND  82  1183.69 1676.46 1910.74 1778.94 1774.25 1173.63  2.76**
WAGE  82  18.04 15.10 15.14 14.52 15.82 14.78 2.00*
CREDDEBT  373 10.77 9.53 7.71 10.50 9.09 9.79  2.20*
Performance indicators 
PROFIT1  373  32.19   24.09  27.27  24.63  29.81   28.07   6.05***
PROFIT2 373  24.76   19.73  22.32  20.98  26.02   22.81   3.06**
LIQUIDITY  373  1.22 1.51 1.75 1.45 2.34 2.38  6.49***
LABORPROD 373  303.04   253.70  231.07  276.38  266.72   286.91   3.20***
INVACT  237  23.36   12.63  14.94  15.42  11.06   13.77   1.95*
*, **, *** significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
1) Dummy variable. The value in the table indicates the share of farms with the value “1”. The test statistics in the last 
column show the chi-square value from the non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test of variance differences between more 
independent samples. In the case of numeric variables, the Analysis of variance (ANOVA) is used to test the hypothesis 
that the several means are equal. 
2) Ordinal variable. The test statistics in the last column for these variables gives the chi-square value from the non-
parametric Kruskal-Wallis test of variance differences between more independent samples. The means are used to 
demonstrate the cluster differences. 
  11The first cluster groups LTDs, and thus typical profit-maximising firms. These farms mainly hire 
external labour and the level of external ownership is insignificant (11%). Their ownership structure 
is further assigned by a very low number of owners, high share per owner of the company assets 
(CAPSHARE2), and significantly lower ownership share differences (OWNDIF) than in other 
clusters. A markedly lower agency problem refers to low interest differences between owners and 
managers, and the significantly higher interest of owners in the companies’ operation. The LTDs’ in 
cluster 1 are assigned by very high transformation indebtedness. This, in our assessment, relates to 
their lower willingness rather than lower feasibility of settling their transformation debts to REPs. 
Clusters 2, 3 and 6 group companies which are mostly cooperatives; JSCs only represent a 
small share. Most of these companies were established during the collective farm transformation 
period at the beginning of transition and are very similar in their external and employee ownership 
structure. Among the all clusters, companies in cluster 2 have the highest per member ownership 
share (CAPSHARE). With regard to transformation debts, cluster 2 peaks out when compared to the 
other two “cooperative clusters”. The low transformation indebtedness leads us to mark this cluster 
as Low Debt CRTs
7. Also, the high average capital share per owner in the Low Debt CRTs and the 
similar span between the richest and poorest owner as in clusters 4, 5, 6 suggest a high minimum 
member deposit (higher than in the other “cooperative clusters”) which likely reduced the number 
of eligible members who were able or who wanted to enter the new cooperative. It might also 
indicate that a company of this cluster was meant to be established by members committed to the 
company. 
Cluster 3, which consists of only cooperatives, is defined as Struggling LMFs; their 
transformation indebtedness is high, their ownership is disperse and the value of average member 
share is very low (33,000 Czech Crowns). Moreover, equity is low and almost 5 times smaller than 
                                                 
7 The variable PARTEST suggests that a significantly higher share of these cooperative compared to the other two 
“cooperative clusters” were established from only a part of the original cooperatives. For this form of transformation, it 
was characteristic that the economically healthier (less indebted) parts of the original cooperative were transformed into 
a new cooperative; the rest went to bankruptcy. This could represent one of the reasons for the lower indebtedness of 
the cooperatives in cluster 2. 
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and even members put a modest deposit in the company’s equity. Obviously, these companies have 
not dealt extensively with transformation debts; they were likely not able to. As suggested by 
slightly lower average credit indebtedness, they might have had greater problems with obtaining a 
bank credit than other “cooperative clusters”.  
In contrast to the other two cooperative clusters (2,3), cluster 6 exhibits a significantly lower 
agency problem. Thus, we name it Low Agency CRTs. It concentrates mainly cooperative farms 
with a “smaller” size (1,000 hectares, on average). The owners’ high interest in the firm’s operation 
seems to contrast with the low value of individual member share and the relatively high number of 
owners. However, the size, ownership and agency relationship suggests that these companies’ 
objective was to limit expansion in order to maintain efficient management/control. This possibly 
contributed to a high lever of labour productivity in this cluster.  
The last two clusters, clusters 4 and 5, represent two factions of mainly JSCs. Companies in 
cluster 4 were almost exclusively established later in transition as the successors to cooperatives. 
Therefore we will mark them as New Companies, while we keep the name JSCs for cluster 5. 
Cluster 5 contains only four JSCs, however, it highlights important differences within JSCs. The 
similar traits between New Companies and JSCs rests in the significantly high number of owners, 
the highest share of external ownership, the lowest transformation indebtedness, and voting systems 
proportional to equity shares. The high external ownership and low transformation indebtedness 
indicate that these companies utilised the JSC legal form to capitalise their liabilities to the REPs, 
and in this way REPs turned in shareholders. While the average per owner equity shares are the 
lowest in these two clusters, there is the largest ownership share span and thus inequality among 
owners. These two groups differ in revenues, resulting from the size of non-agricultural production. 
This production diversification of companies in cluster 5 seems to be the source of the significantly 
higher return per hectare, and in the end, the higher profitability. 









LTD LowDebt StruggLMF NewComp JSC LowAgencyC
P1=0, P2=0.5, LP=0.15,LQ=0.15,IN=0.2 P1=0, P2=0.5, LP=0.2,LQ=0.15,IN=0.15
P1=0, P2=0.4, LP=0.3,LQ=0.15,IN=0.15 P1=0.3, P2=0, LP=0.3,LQ=0.15,IN=0.25




Note: P1 - PROFIT1 , P2 - PROFIT2, LA – LABORPROD, LQ – liquidity, IN – INVACT.  
Source: own calculation 
In our performance assessment we considered five characteristics: profitability with and without 
subsidies and agri-environmental payments, labour productivity and liquidity and investment 
activity. We adopted a simple multi-criteria approach in which we ranked farms in each 
performance variable and then calculated weighted score; the higher score the better performance. 
In Figure 1 we summarise the assessment considering six weighting schemes. It is important to 
keep in mind that our ranking approach produces only indicative judgement that we cannot judge on 
absolute differences between clusters. 
Obviously, profit-maximising firms (LTDs, New Companies and JSCs) perform better; 
particularly, LTDs exhibit a distinct performance. Of the three cooperative clusters (2, 3, 6) cluster 
6 – Low Agency Cooperatives performs best and comparably well as both JSCs (New Companies 
and JSCs) clusters. In contrast, clusters 2 and 3 (Low Debt CRTs and Struggling LMFs) exhibit the 
poorest performance in the multi-criteria analysis. 
6 Conclusions 
  14If our underlying assumption, that CRTs, particularly cooperatives, were established as 
LMFs holds, we can interpret the analysis following Miyazaki’s model as follows: The sector is in 
transition from LMFs to PMFs; the lowest performing are cooperatives representing LMFs. 
Transitional JSCs
8 show improved performance, with the highest performing being PMFs (LTDs). 
However, the detailed cluster comparison shows that slight or temporal deviations from this 
trajectory may occur. These can likely be accounted to agency problems and the low engagement of 
owners in companies’ operations.  
To gain better insight into the problem, we investigated the distribution of ownership shares 
in multi-owner companies. Based on the size of the equity, the average share and the span between 
the richest and poorest owner, we estimated truncated normal distribution of equity shares for each 
cluster. The important result of this effort is that we could speculate about the existence of a group 
of dominant owners. This might be particularly the case of Low Agency, New and Joint Stock 
companies, where 5% of owners will own 13% of equity, and 25% of owners own almost half. 
Thus, the richer owners are easy identifiable and management can easily collaborate with them. In 
contrast, this is not the case with Low Debt companies, where the bulk of owners will always own 
enough to be motivated to participate in the assembly. Thus, it is likely that management must deal 
more or less with all owners.  
Because the share of employed owners of the total number of owners is twice as high in both 
of the poorly performing clusters (over 20%) than in the Low Agency cluster and the two JSC 
clusters (around 10%), it brings us to the assumption that employee preferences might be more 
extensively incorporated in the firms’ objectives in the former clusters. 
To conclude, this indicates that the concentration trend might be behind the success of a 
seemingly LMF cluster (Low Agency CRTs) rather than solidarity, and thus there will be a high 
probability that these farms will sooner or later convert into PMFs. In contrast, we can hypothesise 
                                                 
8 We consider new companies as transitional because of their high share of employed owners, thus the business 
objective is likely to be a mixture of profit maximisation and employment/wage utility maximisation. 
  15that it might be even the strong multiple ownership (cluster 2) that blocks firm development by not 
allowing the concentration of dominant owners.  
While our analysis has demonstrated the relevance of arguments of both the neoclassical and 
institutional theories of labour-managed firms’ evolution, it has also shown that there are still 
empirical gaps, and additional research will be needed to understand the structural change. 
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